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I
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, judges have had tremendous flexibility in sentencing. Offering
judges maximum discretion in the sentencing process allows them to consider
not only an offender’s criminal history and the severity of the crime committed,
but also the complex web of mitigating and aggravating factors present in each
case and additional qualitative factors, such as a defendant’s testimony or selfpresentation in a courtroom.
When judges are empowered with more discretion, however, there is
heightened potential for inter-judge variability in sentencing. In order to reduce
sentencing disparities caused by individual sentencers, several countries and
jurisdictions, most notably in the United States, have enacted laws reducing
judicial discretion over the type and length of sentence to be imposed on a
defendant for a given offense. The purpose of these sentencing laws is to
introduce more formal, rational decisionmaking processes and explicit rules
into the legal sentencing system in order to improve inter-judge consistency and
1
reduce disparities. Whether sentencing guidelines usually succeed in reducing
2
unwarranted disparities is a highly debated question.
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1. See JOHN H. KRAMER & JEFFERY T. ULMER, SENTENCING GUIDELINES: LESSONS FROM
PENNSYLVANIA 1–12 (2009); Robin L. Lubitz & Thomas W. Ross, Sentencing Guidelines: Reflections
on the Future, SENTENCING & CORRECTIONS: ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Office of Justice
Programs, National Institute of Justice, Wash., D.C.), June 2001, at 1, 1–7; Joachim J. Savelsberg, Law
That Does Not Fit Society: Sentencing Guidelines as a Neoclassical Reaction to the Dilemmas of
Substantivized Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1346, 1346 (1992).
2. See CASSIA SPOHN, HOW DO JUDGES DECIDE? THE SEARCH FOR FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE IN
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Nevertheless, regardless of whether unwarranted disparities are reduced, it
is often argued that sentencing guidelines and other limits on judicial sentencing
discretion have a substantial side effect on the balance of power in court.
Instead of mitigating the effect of personal discretion, the guidelines transfer
3
much of the sentencing power and discretion from judges to prosecutors.
Using a comprehensive set of data from Israel, we analyze sentencing
outcomes for offenders convicted of aiding illegal aliens. These data are
assessed to examine whether sentencing guidelines are likely to transfer
sentencing power from judges to prosecutors in the Israeli system.
The next section is devoted to the discussion of the Israeli sentencing
process and a description of the evolution of the sentencing law for aiding an
illegal alien, including the Israeli Supreme Court’s guiding decisions of Khatib
4
and Abu-Salem. Next, the literature on the effects of sentencing reforms on
judicial and prosecutorial sentencing discretion is discussed. After making
comparisons with American sentencing guidelines studies on the effect on
judicial and prosecutorial discretion, we turn to the examination of Israeli
sentencing practices during three different consecutive sentencing periods for
this offense: pre-Khatib, post-Khatib, and post-Abu-Salem. This examination
includes an analysis of the extent to which prosecutors and the courts
circumvented the judicial guidelines in Khatib and their modification in AbuSalem. Furthermore, we assess whether prosecutors gained additional
sentencing control, previously vested in judges, after the Khatib guidelines
limited judicial discretion in sentencing. The article concludes by exploring the
legal and social ramifications of the findings.
A. Background on Sentencing Policy in Israel
Israel is home to approximately eight million people. Despite its small
population, Israel has a relatively high incarceration rate: not including security
prisoners, the incarceration rate is 205 per 100,000 persons—twice the rate of
5
most Western European countries —though still much lower than the
6
incarceration rate of the United States.
Israel’s criminal justice system is similar to that of most common law
countries, but with some important distinctions. After the police make an
arrest, prosecutors decide whether to press charges. If a defendant is charged,
he or she can negotiate a plea agreement with the prosecutor, plead guilty

PUNISHMENT 299–306 (2d ed., 2009) (“[D]etermining whether sentencing guidelines have reduced
disparity is complicated.”)
3. See discussion infra Part I.C.
4. CrimA 5198/01 Khatib v. State of Israel 56(1) PD 769 [2001]; CrimA 3674/04 Abu Salem v.
State of Israel (Feb. 12, 2006), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription).
5. Ruth Kannai, Sentencing in Israel, 22 FED. SENT’G REP. 223, 223 (2010).
6. See ROY WALMSLEY, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST
(8th ed., 2009), available at http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/downloads/wppl-8th_41.pdf.
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without an agreement, or elect a bench trial. There are no juries in Israel. A
public defense attorney is provided for unrepresented defendants in every case
that might result in imprisonment.
There are three levels of courts in Israel. The lowest level is the magistrate
court, followed by the district court, which is both a court of first instance for
serious crimes and an appellate court for other offenses, and then by the
Supreme Court, the highest court in Israel. Because the offense selected for this
paper is tried in magistrate courts, this lower court system is explored here in
further detail. Magistrate judges try criminal cases that are punishable by a
maximum of seven years imprisonment. A single magistrate judge presides over
8
each case, except in special instances where a three-judge panel is appointed.
Israeli judges enjoy a high level of discretion in sentencing. Minimum
sentences are rare, and even then, judges are permitted to consider mitigating
circumstances and to depart from the minimum sentence as long as they state
9
the reasons for their decision. Maximum penalties exist for all offenses, but in
practice judges rarely impose sentences close to the maximum. Instead, they
often offer significantly lighter penalties, including a fine, probation, or
community service. Until 2011, judges under Israeli law had no directives
10
outlining which factors to consider while sentencing, or how to prioritize them.
Given that sentences in Israel are subject to a relatively stringent appellate
review, however, the appeals process is expected to mitigate some of the
disparity resulting from judicial sentencing decisions.
Until a decade or two ago, criminal law was rarely an issue in political
activities and campaigns. This situation has changed lately, and a “tough on
crime” political environment led the Knesset to increase the severity of
sentencing, which resulted in the adoption of minimum sentences for several
11
offenses. The Knesset has also discussed adopting a new sentencing reform,
whereby a sentencing committee would determine starting-point sentences for
common offenses. These starting-point sentences would instruct judges as to the

7. The Judiciary: The Court System, ISR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2008),
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Branches+of+Government/Judicial/The+Judiciary-+The+
Court+System.htm.
8. Id.
9. Murder is an exception to the rule. A mandatory life imprisonment for murder can be avoided
only under a few exceptional circumstances prescribed by law.
10. In 2011, after the data were collected, the Knesset adopted a new sentencing law making
commensurability between the gravity of the offense and the sentence the main sentencing
consideration. See Kannai, supra note 5; Penal Law (Amendment No. 113), 5737-1977, 2337 LSI 170
(2012) (an unofficial translation of the amendment can be found at http://weblaw.haifa.ac.il/
he/Events/Punishment/Documents/the%20new%20Israeli%20law.pdf).
11. See Penal Law (Amendment No. 91), 5737-1977, 2067 LSI 2, § 377B (2006) (adopting a
minimum sentence for offenses of keeping a person under conditions of slavery and human trafficking);
Penal Law (Amendment No. 55), 5737-1977, 1746 LSI 226, § 329(B) (2000) (adopting a minimum
sentence for causing grievous harm to a family member); Penal Law (Amendment No. 68), 5737-1977,
1849 LSI 422, § 355 (2002) (adopting a minimum sentence for several sex offenses).
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appropriate sentence for a typical case of a given offense. If the bill passes,
judges will be expected to begin considering a sentence from the starting-point
sentence, deciding on the degree and direction of deviation from it by weighing
13
all of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Recently, the Knesset
committee responsible for preparing the sentencing reform legislation decided
to split it into two parts. They passed only the general part of the bill that deals
with the sentencing considerations and factors, leaving the part that authorizes
a committee to issue starting-point sentences to be decided in the future. Thus,
the debate over sentencing guidelines in Israel is ongoing.
Recently, many countries have considered or adopted sentencing guidelines.
In the concurrent debate in the Knesset, which will shape future Israeli
sentencing law, it is particularly critical and urgent to examine whether
sentencing guidelines achieve their goal. Fortunately, the Supreme Court’s
decisions in two cases about aiding an illegal alien, an offense according to
14
section 12A of the Entry to Israel Law, offer a rare opportunity to empirically
examine the effect of sentencing guidelines in Israel.
B. Sentencing for the Offense of Aiding an Illegal Alien
Under section 12A of the Entry to Israel Law, it is an offense, punishable by
a maximum term of two years of imprisonment, to harbor, employ, or
15
accommodate a foreign national who is illegally in Israel. The majority of
16
illegal aliens aided are Palestinians from the West Bank.
The Supreme Court established sentencing guidelines for aiding illegal
17
aliens in the case of Khatib. Khatib was a contractor who drove an illegal alien
18
whom he planned to employ from the West Bank into Israel. He was
sentenced to thirty days of imprisonment and appealed the decision first to the
19
district court and then, with permission, to the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court decided to hear his appeal in order to “clarify the appropriate sentencing
20
policy for this offense.” The Court reviewed several decisions of lower courts,
finding that sentences ranged from fines and deferred sentences, to prison terms

12. See Oren Gazal-Ayal & Ruth Kannai, Determination of Starting Sentences in Israel—System
and Application, 22 FED. SENT’G REP. 232 (2010).
13. Id.
14. Entry into Israel Law, 5712–1952, 6 LSI 159, § 12A (1951–1952) (amended 1995).
15. Id. The conduct required for this offense will hereafter simply be described as aiding an illegal
alien. Until 2000, this was an administrative offense, punishable mainly by a fine. Nevertheless, the
prosecution had the power to indict such offenders instead of fining them, but had to state their reasons
for doing so in writing. In fact, the police prosecution service disregarded the rule requiring the
preference for an administrative fine, and used the regular criminal proceedings in virtually all cases. In
April 2000, it became a regular criminal offense.
16. Section 12A defines a foreigner as a person entering from the West Bank and Gaza. Since
Gaza is relatively isolated, almost all of the illegal aliens come from the West Bank.
17. See CrimA 5198/01 Khatib v. State of Israel 56(1) PD 769 [2001].
18. Id. at 771.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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of several months. Justice Tirkel, writing for the Court, stated that he supported
the harsher approach, and commented that had the state appealed, he would
have been in favor of substantially increasing the sentence due to the wave of
21
terror killings at that time. According to Justice Tirkel, because the terror
attacks are usually committed by Palestinians entering Israel illegally from the
22
West Bank and Gaza, any help to such illegal aliens should be treated harshly.
The Supreme Court provided guidance to the lower courts, stating that,
barring very exceptional circumstances, the appropriate sentence for aiding an
illegal alien should be imprisonment that should not be deferred or exchanged
for community service, even if the defendant committed the offense out of
23
naïveté or due to pressing needs of some sort. The Court also clarified that
lack of a prior criminal record should not qualify as an exceptional
24
circumstance. Because Supreme Court decisions in Israel bind the lower
25
courts, this ruling established a de facto mandatory sentencing guideline of a
26
few months of imprisonment.
Like most minor crimes and misdemeanors, this offense is prosecuted by
police prosecutors, not the district attorneys. Following the Khatib decision, the
head of the prosecution division in the police headquarter in Jerusalem issued
guidelines instructing prosecutors to request a term of imprisonment in every
27
case of aiding an illegal alien. These prosecutorial guidelines caused many
defendants to ask the attorney general to issue a stay of proceedings, arguing
that the possible sentence they face is too severe, taking into account all the
circumstances. These requests brought the issue to the attention of the
Attorney General, who nominated a committee to examine the prosecutorial
policy in these cases. In January 2005, the committee recommended that police
prosecutors adopt a more lenient approach and take into account the personal
circumstances of the defendant. However, the police objected to this change in
28
policy. The attorney general rejected their objection, and in May 2005 the state
attorney issued new guidelines to the police prosecutors.
Soon after, in February 2006, a much more important change in policy was
imposed. After the Supreme Court rejected several requests to review its policy
29
over the years, the Court decided again to hear appeals from several separate

21. Id. at 774.
22. Id. at 773–774.
23. Id. at 775.
24. Id.
25. Basic Law: The Judiciary, 5744–1984, SH No. II 10 § 20(b), available at
http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic8_eng.htm.
26. The court did not specify the number of months.
27. RECOMMENDATION OF THE COMMITTEE FOR THE EXAMINATION OF THE ENFORCEMENT
POLICY OF EMPLOYING, DRIVING AND ACCOMMODATING ILLEGAL ALIENS IN ISRAEL (2005) (on
file with authors).
28. Id.
29. CrimA 4094/05 Ka’adan v. State of Israel (Apr. 28, 2005), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription); CrimA 2392/05 Saliman v. State of Israel (May. 4, 2005), Nevo Legal Database (by
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defendants who had been sentenced to prison for aiding illegal aliens, and to
issue guidance on the matter. This time, the Court adopted a more lenient
approach. In Abu-Salem, the Court clarified that the wording of the
“exceptional circumstances” provision from Khatib should not be interpreted
30
too narrowly because sentences should always be individualized.
Implementing this new interpretation, the Court accepted the five separate
appeals of defendants who had been sentenced to imprisonment under the
Khatib precedent. Though the Khatib decision was not officially overturned in
Abu-Salem, the acceptance of the appeals of all five defendants in Abu-Salem—
each with different circumstances—was perceived as altering the rigid Khatib
guidelines. Thus, beginning with Abu-Salem, the Court set a weaker
presumptive sentencing law for aiding an illegal alien in place. The new decision
was quickly incorporated into the guidelines the State Attorney issued to police
31
prosecutors.
Israeli case law therefore defined three different periods of sentencing for
the offense of aiding an illegal alien. Before Khatib, no guidelines existed.
Between Khatib and Abu-Salem, a relatively rigid sentencing guideline was in
place. After Abu-Salem, a less rigid presumptive incarceration sentence was
adopted.
C. Literature Review
Critics of sentencing reforms in the United States often voice their concern
that guidelines transfer sentencing power to the prosecutor: “the Guidelines
provide opportunities for [prosecutors] to pursue their own agendas that did not
32
exist pre-Guidelines.” Dale Parent, the Director of Minnesota’s Sentencing
Guidelines Commission from 1978 through 1982, showed that changes in
prosecutors’ charging and negotiation practices occurred following the
33
implementation of the Minnesota guidelines. Professor Michael Tonry argued
that mandatory penalty laws “provoke judicial and prosecutorial stratagems,

subscription); CrimA 8758/04 Agrabia v. State of Israel (Sep. 27, 2004), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription); CrimA 9145/03 Mosail v. State of Israel (Nov. 9, 2003), Takdin Legal Database (by
subscription); CrimA 8474/03 Vazuz v. State of Israel (Sep. 21, 2004), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription).
30. See CrimA 3674/04 Abu-Salem v. State of Israel (Feb. 12, 2006), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription).
31. ENFORCEMENT POLICY FOR EMPLOYERS, DRIVERS AND ACCOMMODATORS OF ILLEGAL
ALIENS guidelines no. 2.15 (2006) (on file with authors).
32. James M. Anderson, Jeffrey R. Kling & Kate Stith, Measuring Inter-Judge Sentencing
Disparity Before and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271, 302 (1999).
33. DALE G. PARENT, STRUCTURING CRIMINAL SENTENCES: THE EVOLUTION OF MINNESOTA’S
SENTENCING GUIDELINES 181–186 (1988). Parent wrote that immediately following the
implementation of the Minnesota guidelines, the imprisonment rate for all convicted felons dropped,
but, nevertheless, within five years, the imprisonment rate had returned to the pre-guidelines level. Id.
Parent cites several reasons for the increase, including “changes in the distribution of offenders on the
sentencing grid stemming from changes in prosecutors’ charging and negotiation practices.” Id. at 190.
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usually by accepting guilty pleas to other nonmandatory penalty offenses or by
34
diverting offenders from prosecution altogether, that avoid their application.”
Judges agreed that a shift in power occurred after the implementation of
sentencing guidelines. A study commissioned by the American Bar Association
found that 76% of federal judges and 59% of state judges thought sentencing
35
guidelines offered prosecutors too much power in plea bargaining. Still, 73%
of surveyed judges thought plea bargaining was used with about the right
36
frequency. In one survey of twenty federal district judges, 80% of those
surveyed said that the guidelines “have transferred discretion in large measure
37
to the prosecution.” Additional discontent was expressed by probation
officers, who complained that “‘fact bargaining’ is undermining the sentencing
38
guidelines.”
Interestingly, some prosecutors felt that guidelines limited their discretion.
A county prosecutor in Missouri stated, “Prosecutors continue to be unhappy
with the one-size-fits-all recommendations in the Missouri Sentencing Advisory
Commission’s recommendations. . . . There is, simply, no way to include enough
variables in a recommended sentencing structure to provide a meaningful
39
recommendation for any individual crime.”
These surveys may demonstrate that judges believe that the guidelines
transferred sentencing powers. However, impressions based only on personal
40
experience are often problematic sources of information about the reality.
Despite interest in the alleged transfer of power between the court actors, the
many studies of the effects of sentencing guidelines failed to examine whether
sentencing guidelines actually transferred control over sentences from judges to
41
prosecutors. Such a study would require quantification of the sentencing
powers of judges and prosecutors both before the implementation of sentencing
guidelines and after—a task that is not trivial.

34. Michael Tonry, Judges and Sentencing Policy—The American Experience, in SENTENCING,
JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND TRAINING 137, 152 (Colin Munro & Martin Wasik eds., 1992).
35. Don J. DeBenedictis, How Long is Too Long?, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1993, at 74, 79.
36. Id.
37. Marvin E. Frankel, Sentencing Guidelines: A Need for Creative Collaboration, 101 YALE L.J.
2043, 2046 (1992).
38. Fact bargains are plea agreements in which the parties stipulate the version of events that will
be presented in court. See Paul J. Hofer, Kevin R. Blackwell & Barry Ruback, The Effect of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines on Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 239, 262
(1999).
39. B. Watson, Prosecutors Seek Changes to Sentencing Guidelines, JEFFERSON CITY NEWS TRIB.,
June 8, 2010, at 7 (The prosecutors’ association added that the “recommended sentences . . . are
unreasonably lenient, particularly for violent and sex crimes.”).
40. Berndt Brehmer, In One Word: Not from Experience, 45 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 223 (1980).
41. Rodney L. Engen, Have Sentencing Reforms Displaced Discretion over Sentencing from Judges
to Prosecutors?, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 75, 82 (John L. Worral
& M. Elaine Nugent-Borakove eds., 2008) (analyzing studies in the field and concluding that none of
them have directly addressed the question).
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Several studies have examined part of this question, however. For example,
moderate evidence of the circumvention of prosecutorial guidelines reported
has shown that guidelines were manipulated in 20% to 35% of guilty plea cases
42
for similarly situated offenders. In some cases, the extent of the deviation
43
reached 70% to 90%. The same study shows that the circumvention of
guidelines was much more common in weapons and drug possession cases, in
which the guidelines prescribed sentences that were harsher than the typical
pre-guidelines sentencing practices. The Khatib guidelines similarly deviated
from the pre-Khatib practices.
However, this study did not compare the effect of prosecutorial behavior
under the guidelines to the effect that pre-guidelines prosecutorial practices—
such as charge bargaining and sentence recommendation—had on sentencing.
The study showed that prosecutors can, and sometimes do, circumvent the
guidelines, but it did not show whether prosecutors affect the sentences more
after the establishment of the guidelines than they did before. This type of study
fails to show that it is the guidelines that have led to the increase in
prosecutorial sentencing power relative to the judicial power.
An analysis of charge bargaining may reveal the effect of the guidelines on
prosecutorial sentencing power. An increase in charge bargaining may be an
indication of an increase in prosecutorial influence on sentencing, especially
when the guideline sentence is prescribed for the “charged offense” and not the
44
“real offense.” The studies examining prosecutorial practices do not show a
clear pattern, however. One study shows a modest but significant decrease in
45
charge bargains in Ohio after implementing guidelines. Since the Ohio
guidelines are very “soft,” offering judges very limited guidance and
considerable sentencing discretion, the authors concluded that “even modest
shifts in sentencing practices might generate noticeable differences in
46
processing at other decision points within the system.”
Conversely, various studies of the effect of the Minnesota Sentencing
Guideline on charge reduction demonstrated that the overall guilty-plea rate
remained constant under the guidelines, while charge bargains rose from 21%
47
to 31% between 1978 and 1982. However, a more statistically sophisticated
42. Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 NW. U. L. REV.
1284, 1285 (1997).
43. Id. at 1292.
44. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines adopted a modified “real offense” sentencing system,
requiring the judge to take into account the facts of the case, even if proving these facts in the jury trial
phase would lead to a conviction of a more serious crime. In a “charge offense” sentencing system, this
is prohibited. See generally Julie R. O’Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ Modified
Real-Offense System, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1342 (1997).
45. John Wooldredge & Timothy Griffin, Displaced Discretion Under Ohio Sentencing Guidelines,
33 J. CRIM. JUST. 301, 314 (2005).
46. Id. at 314.
47. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, THE IMPACT OF THE MN SENTENCING
GUIDELINES: THREE YEAR EVALUATION 71 (1984).
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study analyzed the Minnesota data and concluded that the overall rates of
charge bargaining stayed constant before and after the implementation of the
48
guidelines.
Interestingly, even the Minnesota Sentencing Commission study that
showed an increase in charge bargaining after the implementation of the
guidelines did not indicate an increase in prosecutorial sentencing power.
Although the reported rate of charge bargains increased after the
implementation of the guidelines, the rate of sentence bargains was more than
49
halved—falling from 60% to 26%. It is thus unclear whether prosecutorial
control over sentencing increased or decreased following the introduction of the
Minnesota guidelines. Perhaps in the pre-guidelines period, prosecutors
influenced sentences through sentence bargaining, and then exerted the same
level of influence after the implementation of the guidelines through the use of
charge bargaining. The commission also admitted that many other unanalyzed
factors might account for the differences and the descriptive statistics provided
should not be used to make evaluative conclusions. To the extent that changes
in the use of plea bargaining can signal an increase in the relative influence
prosecutors and judges have over sentencing, these studies do not supply
conclusive evidence of such a shift in power.
Several other studies of other jurisdictions analyze the tendencies of
prosecutors to reduce charges under different sentencing guidelines, but
50
without comparing the result to the pre-guidelines charging policies. In a few
studies, researchers have attempted to analyze whether prosecutorial or judicial
discretion more strongly affected sentencing outcomes. Ronald Wright and
Rodney Engen (2006) argued that prosecutorial discretion mattered more than
51
judicial decisionmaking under a sentencing guidelines regime. The analysis of
the changes in charges in North Carolina found that prosecutors reduced
charges in nearly half of all felony cases that resulted in conviction, but that the
effects did not apply equally to all crimes. The study also found that charge
reductions heavily impacted the severity of the average sentence, such that

48. See Terance D. Miethe & Charles A. Moore, Socioeconomic Disparities under Determinate
Sentencing Systems: A Comparison of Preguideline and Postguideline Practices in Minnesota, 23
CRIMINOLOGY 337, 348 (1985); see also Terence D. Miethe, Charging and Plea Bargaining Practices
Under Determinate Sentencing: An Investigation of the Hydraulic Displacement of Discretion, 78 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 155 (1987) (showing that there was little change in the use of charge
bargaining before and after the implementation of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines).
49. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, supra note 47.
50. See Rodney L. Engen & Sara Steen, The Power to Punish: Discretion and Sentencing Reform
in the War on Drugs, 105 AM. J. SOC. 1357 (2000) (showing that prosecutors changed their charging
behavior when sentencing guidelines changed in the state of Washington). For a review of several other
studies showing that prosecutors often reduce charges, thereby affecting the sentences, see Engen,
supra note 41 at 77–80.
51. Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, The Effects of Depth and Distance in a Criminal Code
on Charging, Sentencing, and Prosecutor Power, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1935 (2006).
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“charge reductions prior to sentencing have a much greater impact on sentence
52
duration than does the choice among sentencing options under the grid.”
Conversely, a study of one unnamed Midwestern county found that judicial
discretion over sentence length was substantially greater than prosecutorial
53
discretion over charge bargaining. The researchers compared the number of
charge reductions and sentence reductions, and the type of sentences meted out
for a sample of closed felony cases bound over for trial in a city using voluntary
54
sentencing guidelines in 1984. They found that when prosecutors reduced
charges, the presumptive sentences for offenders sent to prison decreased
significantly (an average of forty-six months per case)—but judges reduced the
55
sentences even more (by more than one hundred months on average). For
offenders sentenced to probation, prosecutors reduced sentences by an average
56
of forty-one months, which judges brought down another fifty-nine months.
One explanation for the difference between these results could be that the data
in the former study was collected from a jurisdiction using descriptive and
voluntary sentencing guidelines, whereas the latter study used data from North
57
Carolina, the state with the most mandatory sentencing guidelines. More to
the point, these studies did not compare these post-guidelines results to preguidelines measurements of sentencing discretion.
The studies of sentencing regimes to date indicate that by using charge or
fact bargaining, prosecutors gain some control over sentences when judges’
discretion is limited. However, only a few studies have compared the effect of
prosecutorial sentencing power before and after the introduction of sentencing
guidelines, and these studies have not confirmed the discretion transfer
hypothesis. Additionally, most of these studies have used the rate of charge
bargains (or charge reductions) as the main indicator for the amount of power
prosecutors exert. However, the manipulation of charges in a post-guidelines
environment can substitute for the manipulation of direct sentences in a preguidelines environment (through sentence bargaining). In fact, the Minnesota
sentencing commission’s study shows just that, indicating that the use of
58
sentence bargaining at the time that charge bargaining became more common.
One cannot subsequently conclude from these studies that prosecutors’
sentencing power increased post-guidelines.
Moreover, the literature to date does not show whether sentencing
guidelines have a direct effect on sentences—an effect that is not intermediated

52. Id. at 1972.
53. J. Langley Miller & John J. Sloan, III, A Study of Criminal Justice Discretion, 22 J. CRIM. JUST.
107, 113 (1994).
54. Id. at 112.
55. Id. at 113.
56. Id.
57. See NEAL B. KAUDER & BRIAN J. OSTROM, NAT’L CTR. ST. CTS., STATE SENTENCING
GUIDELINES: PROFILES AND CONTINUUM 5 (2008).
58. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, supra note 43.
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through the charging powers. The existence of such a direct influence would be
important for several reasons. First, charge bargaining is only a crude method
for affecting the sentence, at least when sentencing guideline ranges are large
enough. In many cases it is difficult to fine-tune sentences through charge
bargaining. Second, charge bargaining is not always an option. For some
offenses, there are limited options for reducing the charges. Third, many
advocate the restriction of charge bargaining, among other things, in order to
curtail prosecutors’ sentencing discretion. However, if sentencing guidelines
transfer sentencing powers to the prosecutors even in the absence of charge
bargaining, the efforts to limit charge bargaining might not be sufficient.
Our study uniquely examines only one offense, an offense that is rarely the
subject of charge bargaining. In this study, prosecutors charged the defendants
only with aiding an illegal alien, so the charge bargaining was limited to
dropping one or more counts of that offense in the few cases where the
defendants were charged with several counts of this same offense. Accordingly,
the current study examines the effect of sentencing guidelines on prosecutorial
discretion when charge bargaining is very limited.
This study also differs from its predecessors in several other aspects. First,
previous studies concentrated on the United States. It is unclear whether the
effect of sentencing guidelines on prosecutorial sentencing powers is unique to
the American legal system and to what extent the phenomenon is likely to
repeat in other common law jurisdictions that adopt sentencing guidelines.
Second, most of the American studies examined the effects of a relatively
detailed and rigid sentencing guidelines regime—most prominently the federal
sentencing guidelines, which direct the judges to a very narrow sentencing
59
range. Most of the states studied use a two dimensional grid, which is very
different from the less technical guidelines that have been proposed or are in
existence in other common law countries like England and Wales, and Israel.
Prosecutors may have better control over sentencing under the first type of
guidelines, but not under the second, less restrictive ones. Third, in an attempt
to compare prosecutorial sentencing power before the guidelines and after, the
previous studies analyzed many different offenses. In analyzing thousands of
cases of one specific and simple offense that is usually committed by defendants
with no prior criminal record, the risk that any finding will be the result of
factors such as a change in the mix of the offenses brought by prosecutors or
differences in the character of defendants through the years is substantially
reduced. Hence, this study is the first to examine whether prosecutors gain
direct sentencing powers when judges use non-grid sentencing guidelines.
The study also analyzes the level of judicial compliance with the guidelines
60
in Israel. Studies of the American Federal Sentencing Guidelines pre-Booker
59. In guidelines that use a grid, one axis represents the severity of the offense, and the other
represents the defendant’s criminal record. The sentence or sentencing range is determined by the
intersection of the severity of the offense (the row) with the defendant’s criminal record (the column).
60. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (striking down federal sentencing statute that
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show that the circumvention of guidelines appears in an identifiable minority of
61
62
cases. Many of these circumventions result from prosecutorial requests.
Concentrating on departures not sponsored or initiated by prosecutors reveals
that the numbers are much lower. Between 2001 and 2007 only about 10% of
the sentences included a downward departure from the guidelines that was not
63
requested by the prosecution. In Washington, departures from the guidelines
based on an exceptional-circumstances exception, which contain a similarly
worded exceptional-circumstances rule as Khatib, appeared in fewer than 5% of
64
the sentences. In Minnesota in 2009, where the guidelines offered only
presumptive sentences, downward departures were found in about 20% of the
65
sentences, and upward departures in another 4%. Yet, here too, in at least
61% of these downward departures, the court stated that the prosecutor agreed
or did not object to the departure from the guidelines. Only in 14% of cases did
the judge mention the prosecutor’s objection when departing from the
guidelines. In the remaining 25% of cases, it is unclear whether the prosecutors
66
agreed with the departure or not. Hence, judges decided to depart from the
guidelines contrary to prosecutors’ requests only in a small percentage of the
cases—somewhere between 3% and 8% of the sentences.
The Israeli Basic Law: Ihe Judiciary holds that “a rule laid down by the
67
Supreme Court shall bind any court other than the Supreme Court.” Since the
state can appeal to the district court when the magistrate’s court does not
comply with the ruling, and can also request to appeal to the Supreme Court
when it is necessary to assure conformity, one would expect that such a clear
sentencing rule laid down by the Israeli Supreme Court would be followed in
almost all cases, as it is in Minnesota, Washington, and the U.S. federal system.

required district courts to impose sentences within the range established by the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, rendering the Guidelines advisory and nonbinding).
61. See Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 42, at 1285 (showing that approximately 20% to 35% of
prosecutors circumvent the guidelines through charge bargaining, fact bargaining, bargaining over the
guideline factors, and time bargaining); see also Brian D. Johnson, Jeffery T. Ulmer & John H. Kramer,
The Social Context of Guidelines Circumvention: The Case of Federal District Courts, 46 CRIMINOLOGY
737 (2008).
62. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2012) (authorizing downward
departure for defendants who have rendered “substantial assistance” to law enforcement; other
departure sponsored by the prosecutors can result from plea agreements and fast track programs in
immigration cases).
63. Kate Stith, The Arc of Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117
YALE L.J. 1420, 1458–60 (2008).
64. See Kate Stith, Sentencing Guidelines in Washington State, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1,
2013 at 105, 123–24.
65. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, SENTENCING PRACTICES: ANNUAL SUMMARY
STATISTICS FOR FELONY OFFENDERS SENTENCED IN 2009, at 25 (copies may be requested from the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/msgc5/sentencing_
practices.htm). Another 1% of the sentences included mixed departures.
66. Id. at 30. In the remaining cases the prosecutor’s position was not stated in the decision.
67. Israeli Basic Law: The Judiciary 5744–1984, SH No. II 10 § 20, available at
http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic8_eng.htm.
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On the other hand, if the rule deviates substantially from previous practices,
courts might still look for venues to circumvent this ruling, despite its clarity.
D. Hypotheses
Because the Khatib decision instructed judges to impose a much harsher
sentence than was common pre-Khatib, it was expected that when prosecutors
asked the courts to depart from Khatib downward, courts would accept the
request, knowing that this departure from the guidelines was unlikely to be
appealed. On the other hand, when prosecutors insisted on incarceration,
courts, knowing that an appeal would be likely to succeed, adhered to the
Supreme Court’s instruction. Hence, we predicted that as the rigidity of the
sentencing guidelines increased, prosecutors would gain more sentencing power
at the expense of judicial discretion. We thus hypothesized that Khatib
substantially increased the percentage of cases in which the courts followed the
prosecutors’ sentence recommendations. In contrast, we hypothesized that
Abu-Salem would reduce this percentage to a certain extent, though not to the
pre-Khatib level.
Given that the defendants needed the prosecutor’s mercy much more after
Khatib, we hypothesized that plea bargains were more common post-Khatib,
compared to pre-Khatib. Similarly, since Abu-Salem opened the door for more
discretion in judicial sentencing, the rate of plea bargains was expected to
decrease post Abu-Salem.
II
METHODOLOGY
A. The Offense
The subject matter of this study is the way the legal system treats those who
have been accused of aiding an illegal alien. We selected the offense of aiding
an illegal alien for several reasons. First, it is a very common offense, and
therefore the number of incidents is likely to be sufficient for an elaborate
statistical analysis. Second, this offense is often committed by people with no
prior criminal background, making it relatively easy to control for criminal
record—one of the most significant variables affecting sentencing. Third, it is a
very well-defined offense with hardly any variation that might differentiate
between the offenses. Hence, the characteristics and severity of the offense can
be easily controlled.
B. Data
The study draws on two sources of data. First, it utilizes the police criminalrecords database, which contains data on the total population suspected of
68
violating the relevant offense between 1995 and 2007. This database also
68. For the offense of aiding an illegal alien, see Entry to Israel Law, 5712–1952, 6 LSI 159, § 12A
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includes information about all of the court cases reported during this
timeframe, during which the Supreme Court issued the two major sentencing
decisions regarding this offense, Khatib v. The State of Israel and Abu-Salem v.
69
The State of Israel. The police files include demographic and criminal
information on the defendants—for example, age, nationality, gender, and
criminal record—the date of the offense, whether charges were filed and in
which court, and the court’s decision (including verdict and sentence).
The second source of data is the court archives. The records from the police
database of cases that ended up in court were identified in the court archives in
order to examine the trial process more closely. The archive records were used
to supplement the police data with information related to the court actors
(ethnicity and gender of the judges, the prosecutors, and the defense attorneys).
The court records also yielded more details about the offense: details indicating
whether the defendant was driving, employing, or hosting the illegal alien;
information revealing the motivation of the offender; and information relating
to the legal process, such as the defendant’s plea, the plea agreement if one was
reached, the type of plea agreement, and the sentencing recommendations of
the prosecution and defense.
After merging the data from both sources, we compiled a database of 3,277
court cases in which aiding an illegal alien was the defendant’s only charge.
These offenses were committed from 1995 through 2007, and were retrieved
from fourteen magistrate courts, including all of the large magistrate courts in
Israel. This process resulted in very detailed records about the offender, the
offense, the judge, the prosecutor, the trial process, and the outcome.
C. Descriptive Graphic Analysis
Prior to our multivariate analysis, we present a graphical depiction of the
rate of incarceration decisions in each quarter of a year compared to the rate of
prosecutorial prison recommendations during the same quarter. This form of
presentation yields information about fluctuations in prosecutorial and judicial
compliance with the guidelines put forth by the Supreme Court, as well as the
effect prosecutorial requests had on the judicial decisions over the selected time
span. We then separate the cases that resulted from a sentence bargain and the
cases that resulted from an unconditional guilty plea or trials. This division
helps us examine the association between prosecutorial requests and judicial
decisions when the prosecution and the defendant did not reach an agreement.

(1951–1952).
69. CrimA 5198/01 Khatib v. State of Israel 54(1) PD 769 [2001]; CrimA 3674/04 Abu-Salem v.
State of Israel (Feb. 12, 2006), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription).
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D. Dependent Variable
The dependant variable for this study is the incarceration decision. If the
offender was sentenced to any term of imprisonment, the variable was coded 1.
70
If the sentence did not include imprisonment, it was coded 0.
E. Independent Variables
The independent variables included in the analysis are divided into three
groups: socio-demographic variables, time-related variables, and prosecutionrelated variables.
Socio-demographic variables were used in an effort to control for variance
related to personal characteristics. These variables have been traditionally
considered to have an impact on the severity of the punishment:
Offenders’ nationality was coded as a dichotomous variable with 1
representing Jewish and 0 representing Arab.
Offenders’ age was coded as a continuous variable.
Offenders’ family status was coded 1 if married and 0 if otherwise, which
included single, divorced, and widowed.
Offenders’ criminal history was coded as a dichotomous variable with 1
representing offenders with prior convictions and 0 representing offenders with
no prior convictions.
Judges’ nationality was coded as a dichotomous variable with 1 indicating
that the judge was Jewish and 0 indicating that the judge was Arab.
Due to a lack of overall diversity in the offenders’ gender (almost all
offenders were male), gender was not entered as a control variable in this study.
Time-related variables were used in an effort to measure the effect of the
Supreme Court guidelines. This variable contains the three periods of
sentencing: pre-Khatib, post-Khatib, or post-Abu-Salem. Another time related
variable was the effect of terrorism, which according to the Supreme Court was
71
the reason for their harsher penalty recommendation. This variable was
measured by the accumulated number of terror-activities casualties in the three
years preceding the sentence.
Prosecution-related variables were used in an attempt to measure the
prosecution’s impact on the trial’s outcome. The first variable here was
prosecution request. It was coded as a dichotomous variable with 1 meaning the
prosecution asked for a prison sentence and 0 if the prosecution did not request
imprisonment. The second variable was plea bargain, which is also a
dichotomous variable in which 1 means the case was disposed through plea
agreements and 0 means the disposition was not through a plea bargain. The
type of plea bargain was also coded: when plea bargains included an agreedupon sentence recommendation (sentence bargains), they were coded in a

70. Unlike the United States, Israel does not distinguish between jail and prison.
71. See CrimA 5198/01 Khatib v. State of Israel 56(1) PD 769, 773–774 [2001].

06_GAZAL_BP (DO NOT DELETE)

146

3/19/2013 5:51 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 76:131

separate variable. Plea bargains that referred only to the charges (charge
bargains) were removed from our analysis (5.8% of the convictions, n=71).
Appendix 1 provides a summary of the major variables included in this study,
their coding, and the descriptive statistics for each period.
F. Data Analysis
Most of the study’s variables are categorical. Since the dependent variable—
the courts’ decision to incarcerate—was treated as a dichotomous decision,
logistic regression models were used to estimate the dichotomous outcome.
Following the regression analysis, we calculated the predicted probabilities
72
of incarceration for different profiles of offenders. All the independent
variables that reached statistical significance in the regression models were
included in the profiles according to the following scenarios: the best case
scenario, in which the significant variables receive the values that minimize the
probability of incarceration; the worst case scenario, in which the significant
variables receive the values that maximize the probability of incarceration; and
the average case scenario based on the calculated mean values of the
73
independent variables. Next, in order to assess the impact of the prosecution’s
request for a prison sentence, two more profiles were calculated: those with and
without the prosecution’s request. These additional profiles were calculated
while holding all other variables constant at their average. The final set of
profiles replicated the one described above for each of the periods we referred
to in the study—pre-Khatib, post-Khatib, and post-Abu-Salem.
The study focused on the court’s decision as to whether or not to incarcerate
the defendant. This stage in the criminal justice process is dependent on earlier
decisions, particularly whether the police and prosecution decide to press
74
charges. Because we had the complete police database (N=34,343), which
included cases that both did and did not result in indictment, we were able to
calculate the likelihood of indictment for each period. The final sample
included only those records where an indictment was issued (N=6,493). In the
course of making this choice, the decision to incarcerate is not only a function of
the independent variables at trial, but might also be affected by the probability
of being charged following an arrest. Heckman’s correction (Lambda) was used
to deal with potential sample selection caused by the decision not to press
75
charges against many of the suspects.
-z

72. Prob.(event)=1/(1+e ) when Z=B0+ B1X1+ B2X2+ . . . BpXp.
73. All independent variables that emerged as nonsignificant in the regression analysis were
included in the calculation of the predicted probabilities at their mean value.
74. Acquittals and post-indictment dismissals might also affect the result, but they were too few to
make a difference.
75. See James J. Heckman, The Incidental Parameters Problem and the Problem of Initial
Conditions in Estimating a Discrete Time-Discrete Data Stochastic Process, in STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS
OF DISCRETE DATA WITH ECONOMETRIC APPLICATIONS 179–95 (Charles F. Manski & Daniel
McFadden eds., 1981) (Heckman recommended using a correction variable based on the first decision,
which corrects the possible bias.).
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III
RESULTS
Table 1 presents the rate of incarceration decisions pre- and post-Khatib,
and post-Abu-Salem. As initially expected, we see a dramatic increase in
incarcerations in the post-Khatib era. Prior to Khatib, the courts rarely imposed
imprisonment, with only 3.3% of the convicted defendants being sentenced to
prison. In contrast, following Khatib, 29.7% of the convictions resulted in
incarceration.
After the Abu-Salem decision mitigated the Khatib guidelines, the
incarceration rate went down to 16.4%. This result, on its face, indicates that
the Supreme Court’s decision had an impact on sentencing. Surprisingly,
however, a substantial majority of the cases following the Khatib ruling, but
before Abu-Salem, still did not end in a decision to incarcerate. This result
occurred despite the Supreme Court’s demand for a prison sentence for every
such offender, save for exceptional circumstances. Although almost all convictions in the database resulted from guilty pleas (95.0%), only about half of the
guilty pleas followed a plea bargain. More specifically, of the guilty plea cases,
in only about half of the cases (50.7%; n=1255) did the parties (the prosecution
and the defendant) reach a sentence bargain. In 5.8% (n=71) of the cases, the
parties reached only a charge bargain (these cases were excluded from our
analysis). In 43.5% of the cases (n=1164), the guilty plea was the result of a
unilateral decision of the defendant without an agreement with the prosecutors.
Table 1: Imprisonment prior to and following the Khatib and Abu-Salem decisions.

Pre-Khatib
Post-Khatib
Post-Abu-Salem
Total

No incarceration
945
(96.7%)
948
(70.3%)
454
(83.6%)
2347
(81.8%)

Incarceration
32
(3.3%)
400
(29.7%)
89
(16.4%)
521
(18.2%)

Total
977
(100%)
1348
(100%)
543
(100%)
2868
(100%)

Table 2: Plea bargains prior to and following the Khatib and Abu-Salem decisions.

Pre-Khatib
Post-Khatib
Post-Abu-Salem
Total

Plea bargains
274
(30.7%)
805
(64.2%)
423
(81.5%)
1502
(56.3%)

Unilateral guilty pleas
619
(69.3%)
449
(35.8%)
96
(18.5%)
1164
(43.7%)

Total
893
(100%)
1254
(100%)
519
(100%)
2666
(100%)
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Because we included only cases where aiding illegal aliens was the only offense,
charge bargains could include only removal of one or more charges out of
several charges of this specific offense. We hypothesized that the motivation of
the defendant to plead guilty unilaterally is higher when judges have more
sentencing discretion—that is, when they are not bound by Supreme Court
guidelines. As expected, the number of plea agreements went up sharply from
only 30.7% in the pre-Khatib era to 64.2% post-Khatib. Yet, contrary to our
expectations, the parties increasingly resorted to plea bargaining in the postAbu-Salem era, reaching plea bargains in 81.5% of all cases, when judges gained
back at least some of their sentencing discretion.
A. Prosecution Requests and Court Responses
Our main question was whether the Khatib guidelines transferred
sentencing powers from judges to prosecutors. Figure 1 shows the percentage of
convictions that resulted in imprisonment and the percentage of prosecutors’
requests for such a sentence in each quarter of each year between 1995 and
2007.
Figure 1 displays several clear results. First, more prison sentences were
requested by the prosecution and more prison sentences were imposed by the
courts post-Khatib than in the pre-Khatib era. But the increasing trend of
requesting and imposing prison sentences seems to start more than a year prior
to the Supreme Court decision, indicating that the Khatib guidelines, at least to
some extent, followed an already existing trend rather than initiating it. Figure 1
does demonstrate, however, that this trend gained a dramatic uplift following
the Khatib ruling.
Figure 1: Percentage of prosecution requests for prison terms and court decisions for prison terms
(calculated by quarters of years, with the Khatib decision handed down in the twenty-fourth
quarter and Abu-Salem in the forty-first quarter).
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Similarly, the decline in prosecutors’ request for prison sentences and the
decline in incarceration decisions also began about a year and a half before the
Abu-Salem decision. It appears that here too, the Supreme Court followed an
already existing trend of declining incarcerations. This decline in prosecutors’
requests for prison sentences started long before the state attorney issued the
76
new guidelines that gave a green light to a softer prosecutorial approach.
As Figure 1 shows, line prosecutors and magistrate judges changed the
policies long before either the state attorney’s guidelines or the Supreme
Court’s guidelines allowed such a change. Yet, Khatib probably had an effect on
prosecutors’ sentencing recommendations. A year after Khatib, prosecutors
started asking for imprisonment in the majority of cases, and by the end of 2004,
two years after Khatib, requests for prison terms reached a peak of 73% of the
cases in the thirty-fifth quarter. Judges, on the other hand, imposed prison
sentences only in a minority of cases in all quarters but one: quarter thirty-six,
in which 51% of the convictions resulted in imprisonment.
Figure 2 adds another dimension to the discussion: the effect of sentence
bargains. The gray lines represent the percentage of plea agreements in which
the prosecutors asked for imprisonment (dashed gray line) and the percentage
in which judges followed the request and handed down a prison sentence
(continuous gray line). In this same figure, in black, we added the same
information about the cases where the defendants were convicted without a
plea bargain (mostly following a unilateral guilty plea). The percentages of
cases where the prosecutors asked for imprisonment (dashed black line) and the
percentage of actual prison sentences imposed (continuous black line)
throughout the time period are also presented.
Figure 2: Percent of prosecution requests for prison and court decisions of prison in cases with
and without plea bargaining (calculated by quarters).
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ALIENS, STATE ATTORNEY’S GUIDELINES guidelines no. 2.15 (2005) (on file with authors).
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As expected, when the parties reached a plea bargain, most of the
prosecution’s sentence recommendations for imprisonment were accepted. In
some cases the parties to the sentence bargain agreed that the prosecutor would
ask for imprisonment while the defendant would be allowed to ask for a
different sentence. This granted the courts some discretion, as not all of the
prosecutors’ sentence recommendations were accepted.
Less expected was the relatively high rate of incarceration sentences in plea
bargained cases following the decision in Khatib. While we expected that
sentence bargaining would mainly be used to circumvent the harsh Khatib
guidelines, in the minority of cases in which the defendant opted for a plea
bargain, the process very often ended with the imposition of a prison sentence.
The results of the other cases that were not disposed through plea
bargaining are even more unexpected. In most non-bargained cases in the postKhatib era, prosecutors requested prison sentences. However, judges showed a
high level of independence and, contrary to our hypothesis, often rejected the
prosecutors’ requests. Between Khatib and Abu-Salem only 43% of the
prosecutors’ requests for imprisonment were accepted absent plea bargaining.
In all other cases absent plea bargaining, the court departed from the Khatib
rule contrary to the prosecutor’s request. In other words, in the post-Khatib era,
defendants who did not plea bargain had a much better chance of escaping a
prison sentence than those who plea bargained, regardless of the prosecutor’s
request.
This result contradicts two of our hypotheses. First, it shows that the
circumvention of the Khatib guidelines did not occur by an increased resort to
plea bargaining. Second, it shows that judges were much more willing than
expected to disregard the Supreme Court ruling, even without the prosecutors’
agreement. The result might even imply that some of the defendants who were
willing to accept a prison sentence through a plea bargain would have been
better off pleading guilty without bargaining, and putting their faith in the
hands of the judge instead of the prosecutor.
B. Multivariate Analysis
The next step in the analysis was to determine which variables affected the
probability of receiving a prison sentence following a conviction. Heckman’s
correction for the probability of being indicted was added to the regression
model. Table 3 presents a stepwise logistic regression that contains four sets of
variables (geographic variables, socio-demographic variables, time-related
variables, and prosecution-related variables) that were entered sequentially.
Presenting the five steps separately enables us to follow the changes in the
effect of the variables as more independent variables are introduced into the
model. This method of presentation underscores in this particular case the
dramatic effect that the introduction of the prosecution-related variables
(especially the prosecution’s sentence recommendation) had on the relevance
of the other sets of independent variables.
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The first variable entered into the regression was the district in which the
cases were tried (all were compared to the district of Haifa, which was the
omitted category). In step 1 the regression reveals that there is a variation
between court districts. Two districts are less punitive than Haifa (the Tel Aviv
district and the Northern district) and one district is significantly more punitive
(Jerusalem). As the other sets of variables were entered into the regression, the
effect of the district declined and only the Tel Aviv district (which showed a less
punitive attitude) maintained its significance and seemed to affect the
likelihood of imprisonment.
As far as the demographic variables are concerned (step 2), nationality
seems to play a significant role in all steps. Arabs seem to have a higher
probability of receiving a prison sentence than Jews. Furthermore, Jewish
judges tend to be more likely to impose prison sentences than Arab judges. In
all steps, the prior criminal record of the defendant also seems to be a
significant variable in the decision to impose a prison sentence.
In step 3, we first added the variable representing the period. Following the
distribution of cases in Figures 1 and 2, we divided the time frame into five
consecutive periods:
1. Pre-Khatib 1—Quarters 1–19—from 1995 until the outbreak of the Second Intifada
(the wave of uprising and terror attacks against Israeli targets that started in
October 2000), when
the rate of prosecution requests for prison sentences started
77
rising noticeably;
2. Pre-Khatib 2—Quarters 20–23—from the start of the Intifada until the Khatib
decision;
3. Post-Khatib 1—Quarters 24–36—from the Khatib decision until the end of 2004,
when the prison sentence rate peaked (which coincided with a decline in the
Intifada);
4. Post-Khatib 2—Quarters 37–40—from the beginning of 2005 until the Abu-Salem
decision; and
5. Post-Abu-Salem—Quarters 41–45—from Abu-Salem until the end of 2007.

As Table 3 shows, in periods 3, 4, and 5 the probability of imprisonment
increased compared to period 1.
In the next step (step 4), we introduced the number of terror casualties in
the three years preceding the sentence. This variable arguably represents the
effect that terror had on the prevalence of prison sentences. The regression
shows that the larger the number of terror casualties, the greater the probability
of courts imposing prison sentences. Introducing this variable reduced the effect
of periods 4 and 5 on imposing prison sentences. However, the effect of period
3, the one immediately following the Khatib ruling, remained significant, even
when controlling for terror casualties.

77. The attempt to stop residents of the West Bank and Gaza from entering Israel is motivated
mainly by security reasons, and the level of terrorism was thus included as a factor.
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Table 3: Logistic regression for court imprisonment decisions.

Lambda

Court regions1
Northern District

Tel Aviv District

Jerusalem District

Southern District

Central District

Demographic characteristics
Nationality

Age

Family status

Prior conviction

Judges’ nationality

Periods2
Period 2 (Pre-Khatib 2)

Period 3 (Post-Khatib 1)

Period 4 (Post-Khatib 2)

B
(S.E)
Exp(B)
-.023
(.103)
.997

B
(S.E)
Exp(B)
-.158
(.111)
.854

B
(S.E)
Exp(B)
-.080
(.118)
.923

B
(S.E)
Exp(B)
-.061
(.119)
.941

B
(S.E)
Exp(B)
.013
(.151)
1.013

-1.166***
(.299)
.312
-1.053***
(.249)
.349
.832***
(.209)
2.298
-.108
(.412)
.898
.141
(.195)
1.152

-.422
(.333)
.656
-.705*
(.261)
.494
.805***
(.218)
2.238
.236
(.434)
1.266
.384
(.205)
1.468

-.533
(.353)
.587
-.847**
(.283)
.429
.236
(.246)
1.266
.362
(.477)
1.436
.091
(.229)
1.095

-.646
(.358)
.524
-.946***
(.286)
.388
-.031
(.254)
.970
.295
(.477)
1.344
-.036
(.234)
.964

-.039
(.419)
.962
-.984***
(.309)
.374
.190
(.306)
1.209
1.253*
(.576)
3.502
.405
(.265)
1.499

-1.163***
(.136)
.313
-.008
(.005)
.992
-.419**
(.144)
.658
.637***
(.137)
1.890
1.906***
(.413)
6.728

-.980***
(.143)
.375
-.011*
(.005)
.989
-.328*
(.153)
.721
.790***
(.148)
2.203
2.011***
(.412)
7.469

-.912***
(.145)
.402
-.012*
(.005)
.988
-.324*
(.155)
.723
.824***
(.150)
2.280
2.030***
(.421)
7.613

-.742***
(.180)
.476
-.012
(.007)
.988
-.166
(.197)
.847
.484*
(.182)
1.623
2.231***
(.468)
9.313

.230
(.432)
1.259
2.253***
(.235)
9.513
1.626***

.479
(.435)
1.615
1.214***
(.304)
3.367
1.199***

.250
(.485)
1.285
1.015**
(.359)
2.760
1.067***
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(.197)
5.082
.074***
(.179)
1.077

(.212)
3.317
.185***
(.185)
1.404

(.262)
2.907
.188
(.247)
1.207

.004***
(.001)
1.004

.001
(.001)
1.001

-1.306
-.2.290
-3.688
-3.221
2276.918
2115.505
1895.352 1861.944
147.655*** 161.413*** 220.153*** 33.407***
.095
.191
.313
.331

-.642
(.563)
.526
3.273***
(.474)
26.392
1.811***
(.581)
6.115
-5.867
1197.532
664.412***
.632

Prosecution requests
Plea bargaining

Prosecution- prison

Interaction– plea*prosec_prison

Constant
-2 Log likelihood
Chi square
Nagelkerke R Square
1

Each category of the predictor variable (except the reference category) is compared to the
reference category which is the first category.
2
Each category of the predictor variable (except the reference category) is compared to the
average effect of the former categories.
* p < .05; **p < .005; ***p < .001.

Finally, in step 5, we added the prosecution-related variables. As expected,
Table 3 shows that the most significant predictor of the courts’ decision to
incarcerate is the prosecution’s request. This tendency is enhanced when the
plea includes also a punishment recommendation, as shown by the interaction
variable presented in Table 3.
Next, we focused on the extent to which the prosecution’s request for a
prison sentence affects the likelihood of such a sentence, while controlling for
the variable of a plea bargain. In other words, we wanted to determine whether
the request of the prosecution in and of itself affected the court’s decision or
whether it was the plea bargain that mattered. According to Table 4, as
expected, the prosecution’s request for imprisonment was found to have the
strongest effect on imposing a prison sentence. In order to highlight the effect
of the prosecution’s request on the likelihood of incarceration, we calculated
78
the ratio between the odds ratios of the prosecution effects. The results show

78. The formula {[odds/(odds+1)] - .50} converts odds ratios to probabilities and enables to
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that the prosecution’s requests increase the probability of incarceration in plea
bargained cases by 49.85% and in 46.6% in the absence of plea bargain.
Table 4 highlights the effect of the requested punishment among the pleabargained cases. The prosecution’s request becomes clearly the most dominant
variable in the regression. The unusually high odd ratio of 682 indicates that
when the prosecutor requested imprisonment as part of the plea, almost
invariably, the judge impose imprisonment. When the punishment, whatever it
might be, is part of the agreed bargain, both the norm and the common practice
is that the judge will accept it. Once a plea bargain that includes an agreed
punishment is presented, all other independent variables become insignificant
or have negligible effect on the outcome,.
In the absence of a plea agreement, terrorism did not have a significant
effect, but the period of sentencing was statistically significant. The periods that
seem to be related to a high probability of the imposition of prison sentences
were those that followed the Khatib decision (periods 3, 4, and 5). Demographic
variables also produced significant effects. The regression shows that absent a
plea bargain, the likelihood of imprisonment increased when the defendants
were Arabs, when the judges were Jewish, and when the defendant had a prior
criminal record.
Table 4: Logistic regression for court decisions for imprisonment—divided by five periods—
differential models.
Cases with a plea bargain
Cases without a plea bargain
(n=1276)
(n=1475)
B
EXP(b)
B
EXP(b)
(S.E)
(S.E)
Lambda
.067
1.069
-.080
.923
(.342)
(.198)
Court regions1
Northern region
-.560
.571
.257
1.294
(1.102)
(.488)
Tel Aviv region
.070
1.073
-.947**
.388
(.950)
(.341)
Jerusalem region
1.046
2.847
-.085
.919
(.810)
(.410)
Southern region
2.354
10.529
.947
2.579
(1.616)
(.647)
Central region
1.748*
5.741
.312
1.367
(785)
(.296)
Demographic characteristics
Nationality
-.736
.479
-.640*
.527
(.419)
(.232)

measure and compare the effect prosecution requests has on incarceration decisions. See Cassia Spohn
& David Holleran, The Imprisonment Penalty Paid by Young, Unemployed Black and Hispanic Male
Offenders, 38 CRIMINOLOGY 281, 293 (2000).
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-.002
(.017)
-.525
(.447)
-.068
(.432)
.815
(1.222)

.998
.592
.934
2.260

155
-.004
(.009)
-.283
(.251)
.749***
(.226)
2.415***
(.551)

.996
.754
2.115
11.192

.006**
(.002)

1.006

-.001
(.001)

.999

-16.334
(4309.29)
6.535
(2154.64)
3.908
(1436.43)
3.019
(1077.32)

689.0843

.324
(.502)
1.583***
(.502)
1.486***
(.331)
.163
(.400)

1.382

6.526***
(.538)
-

682.4764

3.353***
(.482)
-.105
(.324)

28.581

2

Periods
Period 2 (Pre-Khatib 2)
Period 3 (Post-Khatib 1)
Period 4 (Post-Khatib 2)
Period 5 (Post-Abu-Salem)
Prosecution requests
Prosecution-prison
Guilty plea
Constant
-2 Log likelihood
Chi square
Nagelkerke R Square
1

49.784
20.463
1.006

-6.175
267.916
846.987***
.848

4.868
4.419
4.868

.901
-6.996
689.245
348.940***
.442

Each category of the predictor variable (except the reference category) is compared to the
reference category which is the first category.
2
Each category of the predictor variable (except the reference category) is compared to the
average effect of the former categories.
3
The second period of the study is very short, including only a small amount of cases , none of
which ended in plea bargain and prison sentence. The odds ratio is calculated to compare the
odds of prison sentence across groups and since one of the groups has 0 cases the calculated odds
ratio is extremely high.
4
The impact of prosecution prison recommendation on receiving prison sentence is measured by
the odds of prison recommendation to receive prison sentence divided by the odds of non-prison
recommendation to receive prison sentence. Since courts rarely impose harsher sentences than
requested in the plea bargain, the last group is very small (only 6 cases, which comprise 2.5% of
the prison sentences) and the odds ratio is extremely high.
* p < .05; ** p < .005; *** p < .001.
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Following the regression analysis (Table 4), we calculated the predicted
probabilities (Table 5) for profiles representing the best, worst, and average
case scenarios. The results show an identical pattern for the best, worst, and
average scenario profiles, indicating that in the absence of plea bargain, the
probability of incarceration is higher than in the plea bargained cases.
However, when examining the effect of the prosecution’s request on the
incarceration probabilities—when all other variables are held at the average—
the pattern reverses. The probability of receiving a prison sentence declines
without a plea bargain: a 16% chance in cases without a plea bargain as
opposed to a 57.9% chance in cases with a plea bargain. This pattern seems to
contradict our expectation that a plea bargain ought to reduce the chances of
receiving a prison sentence. It also shows that the impact of the prosecution in
cases where there was no plea bargaining was significantly weaker.
Table 5: Probabilities of being incarcerated.
With a plea bargain
Best-case scenario
Average-case scenario
Worst-case scenario
Prosecution asked for prison sentence
Prosecution did not asked for prison sentence

.005
.028
.976
.772
.004

Without a plea
bargain
.0003
.105
.966
.338
.017

IV
DISCUSSION
At the onset of our study, we hypothesized that the strict sentencing
guidelines would move sentencing discretion from judges to prosecutors.
Despite the common belief that this displacement of power does occur, studies
thus far have had difficulty proving it. The Israeli Supreme Court ruling in the
Khatib case presented a unique opportunity to examine the effect of such
guidelines, particularly because of the focus on only one single offense.
However, the results do not support the displacement of discretion hypothesis.
Our findings show that the trend of “getting tough” did not start with the
Khatib ruling, and the trend of easing off did not start with Abu-Salem. It is true
that plea bargains became more common following Khatib, but the use of plea
bargaining kept increasing after the Abu-Salem decision as well, when the
guidelines became less stringent. Thus, the popular use of plea bargains is not
necessarily the result of the decision in Khatib. At the very least, additional
reasons may explain the continuous resort to plea bargains. These may include
increased caseloads in the entire criminal justice system, as well as pressures for
efficiency and the quick disposition of cases.
More importantly, when examining cases where the parties did not come to
an agreement, we found no indication of an increase in prosecutorial sentencing
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power. It is true that, following Khatib, the overall number of prison sentences
did increase, even in the absence of plea bargains. However, there is no
evidence that would allow us to attribute this trend to increased prosecutorial
power. Following Khatib, prosecutors asked to imprison most of the defendants
who did not reach a plea agreement, but the courts rejected most of these
requests despite the Supreme Court’s ruling.
Prosecutors may have gained power in plea bargaining. Following Khatib,
many defendants agreed to a sentence bargain that included an imprisonment
component. It might be that defendants, knowing of the Khatib decision and
believing that judges would follow it, found no reason to believe that they had a
chance of escaping prison if they placed their faith in the hands of the court.
Therefore, they were willing to strike a bargain that might send them to prison,
but perhaps for a shorter term.
However, these defendants might have been wrong. When a plea bargain
was not reached, the prosecution had a difficult time convincing the courts to
impose a prison sentence, despite the Khatib guidelines. Prosecutors may have
gained sentencing power because defendants simply were not aware of how
often the courts failed to comply with the guidelines, but in the absence of plea
bargains it was the court, not the prosecutors, who departed from the
guidelines.
Our study does not support the displacement of power hypothesis. Courts
have continued to exert sentencing power by refusing to impose incarceration
sentences even when prosecutors have asked for such sentences based on the
existing Supreme Court Guidelines. The actual effect of the courts’ independent
approach might be even stronger than the data suggests. Prosecutors are repeat
players in court. They appear before the same judges time and time again.
Hence, when there is no plea bargain, they may often adjust their
recommendation in light of the policy of the court, refraining from asking for
imprisonment when they know they will not receive such a sentence. If this is
the case, the magnitude of the magistrate courts power is even stronger than our
result indicates. Though this speculation needs further testing, it is very likely
that had the judges adhered to the Khatib ruling more closely, prosecutors
would have asked for imprisonment in many more cases.
Why have judges demonstrated more independence than the prosecutors?
After all, when judges reject the prosecutors’ request to abide by the guidelines,
they face the risk of being reversed on appeal. On the other hand, prosecutors
who decide to be more lenient than the guidelines require cannot be reversed—
and judges rarely impose a harsher sentence than asked. Accordingly, one
would expect the prosecutors to depart from the guidelines more often than the
judges. Why did the opposite occur?
Several explanations for this puzzling result are possible. Perhaps judges are
less concerned with appeals than expected. It is possible that police prosecutors,
who frequently appear before the same judge, do not initiate such appeals very
often. Similarly, the district attorneys, who must authorize each appeal, do not
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necessarily prioritize appeals on such sentences. Moreover, district courts do
not necessarily differ from the magistrate in their willingness to circumvent the
guidelines. While a second, discretionary appeal from the district court to the
Supreme Court could discipline district courts, the state attorney is very
selective in initiating such second appeals. In fact, in a search of Supreme Court
decisions in requests for discretionary appeal, we could not find even one
request of the state to consider an appeal against a district court decision that
circumvented Khatib. Only defendants appealed to the Supreme Court in this
type of case. Hence, pro-defendant departures from the guidelines are rarely
appealed and even less often reversed. Additionally, it might be that judges are
not so concerned about being reversed. After all, these are not very salient
cases and reversals would not likely impugn their reputations.
On the other hand, we might have underestimated the effect of the internal
prosecutorial guidelines. Perhaps prosecutors did not use their power to
circumvent the guideline more often because of the internal guidelines
instructing them to ask for imprisonment sentences in these cases. The high
levels of compliance with the guidelines may be attributable to the fact that the
prosecutors here are police prosecutors who serve in an organization that
emphasizes hierarchy. Unlike judges, who are subject only to the vague notion
of “the law,” police prosecutors are accountable to their superiors, and their
performance is routinely examined. Police prosecutors might have been
concerned if imprisonment rates for this offense in their office were too low,
despite the clear attempt of the office in Jerusalem to strictly enforce the law on
that offense. In other words, prosecutorial guidelines might have mitigated the
effect that judicial sentencing guidelines had on prosecutorial sentencing
discretion.
It is unclear to what extent we can generalize the effect of the Khatib
sentencing guideline. It is possible that judges will adhere to guidelines more
closely when most cases are subject to a guidelines regime. Moreover, the
Khatib guidelines clearly deviated from the pre-Khatib practices. Courts might
be more willing to follow guidelines that better represent the preguidelines
practices.
Yet the findings do question whether sentencing guidelines in Israel can
achieve their goals. It seems that not only prosecutors are able to circumvent
such guidelines, but that courts can also do the same. Moreover, the proposed
guidelines system, which relies on starting-point sentences, is much weaker than
the Khatib guidelines, which required a specific type of sentence absent
exceptional circumstances. If courts often circumvented this rigid guideline,
issued by the highest judicial instance in the country, they are even more likely
to disregard the proposed weaker guidelines when they perceive it as unjust or
wrong.
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V
APPENDIX:
MAJOR VARIABLES INCLUDED IN THIS STUDY, THEIR CODING,
AND THE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EACH PERIOD
Variables

Codings

Pre-Khatib

Post-Khatib

Post Abu-Salem

Defendants’
Nationality

1 = Jewish
0 = Non-Jewish

573 (54.3%)
483 (45.7%)

593 (38.6%)
945 (61.4%)

250 (41.2%)
357 (58.8%)

Defendants’ Age

Years

39.37 (11.750)

39.92 (12.602)

39.32 (12.719)

Defendants’
Family Status

1 = Married
0 = Not Married

945 (87.0%)
141 (13.0%)

1307 (83.0%)
267 (17.0%)

473 (76.7%)
144 (23.3%)

Defendants’
Prior Convictions

1 = Yes
0 = No

235 (23.8%)
753 (76.2%)

240 (17.4%)
1142 (82.6%)

84 (13.6%)
473 (84.9%)

Guilty Pleas

1 = Plea Bargain
0 = Unilateral
Guilty Plea

274 (30.7%)
619 (69.3%)

805 (64.2%)
449 (35.8%)

423 (81.5%)
97 (18.5%)

Prosecution
Request for
Imprisonment

1 = Yes
0 = No

761 (80.6%)
183 (19.4%)

931 (77.8%)
265 (22.2%)

342 (73.9%)
121 (26.1%)

Incarceration

1 = Yes
0 = No

32 (3.3%)
945 (96.7%)

400 (29.7%)
948 (70.3%)

89 (16.4%)
454 (83.6%)

